GET /v1/mandates/{mandate_id}/evidence returns a flattened JWS with media type application/jose+json.
ES256, resolve the protected kid only from Attesso’s JWKS, and reject every mismatch.
The signed envelope
protecteddecodes to{"alg":"ES256","kid":"<key id>"}.payloaddecodes to the evidence JSON:schema,generated_at,organization_id,mandate, andevents.signatureis an ES256 (ECDSA P-256) signature over the bytesprotected + "." + payload. The signature is the raw 64-byteR || Sform (IEEE P1363), not DER.
Node.js verification (no dependencies)
GET /.well-known/jwks.json (no API key required). The dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' option is required: Node defaults to DER, but Attesso signs with raw R || S.
Go verification (stdlib only)
Python verification (stdlib + cryptography)
What the signature covers
- The immutable Mandate and policy digest
- For a recurring Mandate, the authorized terms digest and the terms it covers
- The verified approval proof
- Every proposed action and Attesso decision, including the period each approved charge was attributed to
- Reservation, commit, cancellation, revocation, and expiry events
- Source-labelled lifecycle assertions supplied by your platform
Event shape
Each event is{sequence, type, resource_version, payload, created_at}. Decision data lives inside payload, so a charge’s period is event.payload.period_index, not event.period_index.
Date.parse keeps milliseconds, so compare instants rather than strings when you mix precisions.
Reconstructing per-period spend
A recurring Mandate carriesexecution_mode, the period terms (period_unit, period_days, period_count, period_max_amount, period_currency, period_anchor), and authorized_terms_digest. Every authorization.created event for an approved charge carries period_index.
Together those are enough to rebuild what was spent in each period without reimplementing the cadence arithmetic: take the terms from mandate, and sum the payment amount on each allowed event by its period_index. Compare the result against period_max_amount to check that no period was overspent, and against period_count to check that no charge fell outside the authorized term.
authorized_terms_digest is the value the approval was bound to. Recompute it over the terms above and the mandate’s valid_from and valid_until, in the order the mandate lists them, newline-separated after the domain line attesso.authorized-terms.v1, and compare. A mismatch means the authority changed after it was approved, so treat it as a verification failure.
Verifying single-use commitments
An authorization created under the single-use requirement records acommitment on its authorization.created event: the SHA-256 of a domain line plus a random opening you keep, so Attesso never sees the opening until the commit reveals it. The commit carries the opening on its authorization.committed event. Check:
- Recompute
SHA-256("attesso:authorization:commitment:v1\n" || opening)over the opening’s raw bytes (not its hex text) and compare against the commitment’s hex digest. A mismatch means the commit does not belong to the creation it claims. - A committed event without a well-formed opening, or more than one committed event for one authorization, is a failure.
- Commits recorded before the requirement carry no commitment on their creation and are labelled historical, not failures.
examples/verify-evidence.js performs these checks after the signature verifies and reports them in its summary:
Verifying refund reports
Anauthorization.reported event is a refund or other external-report claim your platform submitted; Attesso records it and it never changes state. The single-use checks above do not cover it, so check its provenance:
- Every
authorization.reportedpayload carries"source": "integrator_reported". Any other source is a failure: the event is not a claim your platform made. - The cumulative report amounts for one authorization never exceed the committed amount on its
payment.
examples/verify-evidence.js counts report events separately and fails any unlabelled one.
Evidence is not a payment receipt or proof that an external provider performed an action. It distinguishes Attesso-verified events from facts your platform reported.

